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IN THE SUP.REME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RL\ILEDG-E (Tl~1\NllT~I ANl)
1\llXlXO C()J~PC>RAri,[ON and
ICENN1~1,J1 J. 1\icCOllnllUl(,
P l a.i n tiff s-A ppellants,
vs
FEDERAL RESOURCES
CORPQR.ATION and
HECla\ ~I ll\IXG CO~li> ANY,

Case No. 9604

Defendants-Respondents.

APPEL·LANTS' REPLY BRIEF
POINT I.
ALL POINTS RAISED ON APPE.AL WERE
RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT.
Respondents, in their brief, make various statements
·as to what appellants did or did not do ~n the lower Court,
which are not supported by the record, and· with which
Appellants disagree including:

(a) From 1955 to 1960 "appellants have understood the basis upon which their royalty payments
are being computed; they accepted the said payments without objecting or suggesting that the
royalty payments were improperly co1nputed (R.
15) ." (Respondents' brief 10.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The reference to R. 15 i~ to respondents' o'vn answer~
the allegations of 'vhich as a rnatter of law are denied
(lTRCP 8( d)).
The deposition of !IcCormick (D64-65) shows that
the basis for payment 'vas not investigated until 1960
and suit was brougt in 1961.
(b) "In their brief, a1}pellants contend, although
they raiJsed no such objection before the District
Court, that the meaning of the royalty clause in
question is so elear and unambiguous" that the
court may not look to parol evidence. (Respondents' brief 11).

This p·I"oposition \\Tas the very basis of appellants'
1notion for su1nmary judgment and memorandum in support thereof (Tr. 177).
(c) "Ap~pellants contend that this ruling by the
court differentiates their royalty interest 'vith
regard to royalties paid and royalties to be paid,
. . . The court's rulin,g is in accord with the declaratory judgm.ent sought in their complaint."
(Respondents' brief 25-26)
Appellants' sought an accounting, judgment and declaratory judgment all based upon gross proceeds (Tr.
2-3).

(d) "No contention was raised by ap·pellants
that they 'vere entitled to royalties on vanadium
contained in ore proce~ssed. ''
Many interrogatories and answers thereto are in the
record involving this issue ( Tr. 163).
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f)

f)

~he

co1nplaint ~PPks '~an accounting of the gross
proceeds of the sale of ore frorn said claims." ('Tr. 2)
rrhi~ is not lilnited, nor 'vas it intended to be limited to
uraniuu1. Further1nore the c-ourt \\·as advised during the
argtunent that vanadilnn royalties \\rere claimed.
(e)
No contention was raised by appPllants that
... respondents should not be allo\ved to deduct
development allowances paid by lTraniurn Reduction Company." (Respondents' brief 30.)
H

'The language of the co1np~laint covers ~·gross proceeds of the sale'' (Tr. 2) "rhich appellants then and no"·
COntend includes fictitiOUS developlllPnt allo,vances; and
the lo\Yer court 'vas so advised, not only by the corn plaint,
but also in the argument.
(f) "No contention was raised by appellants that
. . . appellants had not received full payment of
royalties based on Circular 5 prices" (Respondents' brief 30.)
The complaint s.eeks "an accounting of the gross
proceeds." (Tr. 2) How much more explicit s'hould it be?
(g) uA full transcript of the hearing on appellants' motion, which is not available because of
a misunderstanding by counsel as to what aspects
of the hearing were being reported, would clearly
sho'v that the only point relied on by appellants
to establish their rig·ht to an accounting was that
their royalty payments should be computed" on
selling price received. (Respondents' brief 30.)
There 'vas no "misun.derstanding" as to a reporter.
It was stipulated the reporter need not take the argument.
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If respondents jntended to rely upon so1ne suppDsed
concessions ·or abandonn1ents hy appellants during their
argument (which appellants deny were made) they should
have pTepared a statement of the proceedings as a part
of the record, in accordance "~ith UR,CP 75 (1n).
(h) ''That appellants considered a determination of this single question to he disposition of the
case is shown by" their n1emorandum. (Respondents' brief 30.)
Appellants' motion was not directed to whether or
not there should be an accounting, but rather what the
basis of an accounting should be. Had appellants prevailed, the case would not have been over; the respondents would still have had to account. Thus, just as pointed
~out in our brief as to respondents' motion, neither motion if granted s,hould have terminated the case. The
issues not before the court were not argued in the memorandum. The questions as to vanadiu1n payments, develop•ment allowances and completeness of accounting
were intentionally not submitted on a motion for summary judgment, and could not prop·erly have been decided
on summary judgment because the record thereon is inadequate. These questions should be decided by the
lowe.r court ~at a trial.
But respondents' contention does not follow that
appellants, by asserting that they are entitled to a summary judgment on one point, thereby \\yaive all other
points on which no such motion is made. URCP 56(a)
expressly provides for a summary judgment "upon all
or any part" of a case.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
(i) The {)Illy contention raised by appellants'
Inotion to arnend the judg~nPnt "'was that app·ellants should be entitled to elect to have their
royalty pa~,.Inents'' based upon concentrated ore
prices less milling costs for all royalty payments,
past and future, rather than having different
bases for past and future. (Respondents' brief 31.)
It \Vould indeed be a novel rule if appellants "'"aived
any point not set out in a motion to amend, as respondents seem to contend.
The court, while making his ruling, was informed by
respondents' counsel that their motion \Vas for a "sumInary judg1nent rather than for no cause of action" ( Tr.
211), to no avail.
The motion to amend was rnade pursuant to URrCP
59 (e), because appellants thought that the judgment was
at variance \Yith the court's oral ruling in this one particular only and that it therefore did not reflect the
court's intention as reflected by the following record:
•'Mr. Lewis : I think it should provide, Your
Honor, that that determination for future can only
be made with resp·ect to future ores, not past ores.
HThe Court: "\Vell, it is identical, isn't

it~

"l\Ir. Lewis: 'Vhat I mean is they shouldn't
be able to elect no\v to treat ores that were mined
and sold months ago - to pay their share of
processing.
"The ·Court: Is there any difference~ Isn't it
identical, penny for penny, up to no\\r ~
''l\Ir. Benson: Yes.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"l\Ir. Le"·is: Perhaps it is.
HThe Court: If he 111akes his election no\v on
how he takes, that 'vill bind hi1n hereafter. Will
you dra\V findings I can sign'
HMr. r_Je\\ris: Yes, Your I-Ionor."

('Tr. 212)

Appellants ·agree with the general proposition argued
by respondents that issues not tried in the lo,ver court
cannot be presented on appeal. rrhe fallacy in respondents' position is that such proposition is in applicable
here because:
1.

The issues \vere presented.

2.

The record shows they were presented.

3.

Respondents having prevailed on their motion
for summary judgment ''have the burden of establishing the lack of a triable issue of fact upon
a record.'' - 6 Moore's Federal Practice 2364.

4.

There was no waiver of issues.

5.

There is no record of any waiver.

All of the cases, except two cited by respondents to
the effect that issues m~ay not be raised for the first time
on appeal, are based upon the fact that the pleadings
did not raise the issues. That is not true here.
One exception is the dicta in Drummond v. Union
Pacific Railro.ad Company, 111 Utah 289, 177 P 2d 903,
relied on by respondents, that the court would not consider new issues. This was in a case in which Mr. Justice
Latimer saw a point not seen by appellate counsel even
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on appeal, 'vhich thP appellate eonrt
w·ould not rule upon.

proper}~·

said it

The othPr exception is in Ricer Plate & Brazil Con-

ferences v.

Pre.~.,·sed

Cir. 1955) 'vhich

Steel Car

"·a~

a

ea~f1

(/onlpal(lJ, 2~7

F 2d 60 (2d

in \\'"hich a snnunary judg-

Iuent \Yas granted defendant because plaintiff, in order
to recover had to

~ho"'"

board approval of the contracts

in question "·hich plaintiff did not sho"'"· The defendant
produced the contracts \vhich showed on their face they
",.ere not approved. The record showed that plaintiff
"can1e for\\·ard 'vith nothing to co1nbat the obvious conclusion that the Board never

ap~proved

any agreement."

On appeal plaintiff asserted there in fact had been an approval. The court rightly held that such assertion came
too late. But that is not similar to the case at bar. In
that case there \vas no question as to whether otheT issues \vere waived, but rather whether new evidence relating to the very point decided on snnrmary judgment
could be considered for the first time on

ap~peal.

In the

case at bar, appellants are not asserting that the Supreme
c·ourt should consider additional evidence on the point
as to whether or not defendants' smnmary judgment
sl~o~d

have b~en granted, but rather appellants are asserting that on the record the summary judgment as to
the basis of accounting was wrong, and that such a ruling
",.as not dispositive of all the issues inthe case. Thus this
case is_ not in point.
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POINT II.
THE ROYALT'Y IS NOT BASED UPON "NET
SMELTER OR 1\III.JL RETURNS," BUT UPON
"GROSS PROC'EEDS OF SALE."
As pointed out in apvellants' brief ( 3), any question
which existed in the record title as to whether the royalty
should be based upon "gross proceeds of sale'' as originally reserved, or upon "net smelter or mill returns" as
recited in a subsequent assignment was resolved by the
adoption of the ''gross proceeds of sale'' language, and
the rejection of the ''net smelter or mill returns" language by defendants' attorney when agreeing with plaintiffs' predecessor on the basis of the royalty.
Despite this, defendants still argue that the royalty
is a "net smelter or mill return" royalty. (Respondents'
brief 12, 19.)
Even if there had been no subsequent agreement between the parties resolving the existing problem in the
record, this argument is untenable for two reasons:
The first reason is as follows. The recitation of
"net mill or smelter return'' is found in the assignment
from Pryor and Deniel to U. & I. lTraniwn Inc. and it
provides:
"Whereas, the undersigned o\\rners and 1ocators by contract deed transferred the title thereto
to one Melvin D. Rueckhaus, as Trustee (for diverse others owners) but subject to a reserved
royalty to tihe undersigned of 15% of the net mill
or smelter returns from any and all ore to be
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thereafter shipped or produced fron1 said mining
ground, and to be paid the said undersigned o'vnen~. ''
The granting language in said assignn1ent is as follo,vs:
~~For

and in consideration of One Dollar, and
other valuable consideration a~ hereinhef.orP referred to, the under:signPd herPby a~sign, set over
and transfer to 1T. & l. lT raniun1 Inc. one-third
of the royalty they V{ere to receive under said
Rueckhause agreement." (Tr. 31)
There is no question that the royalty 'vhich Pryor
and Daniel had 'vas a gT 0Ss and not a net royalty. The
instru1nent creating it is before the ·Court and it so states.
The granting language is broad enough to transfer the
royalty interest \\~h0ther it \\~a~ gross or net.
1

In construing docu1nents the granting language takes
precedence over language contained in recitals. 16 An1.
Jur. Deeds 241 .
. A.n erroneous recital does not affect the operation of
the assignment. Blackburn v. Pond Creek Coal & £,and
Co., ______ Ky. ______ , 287 S.W. 2d 610.
The assignment to U. & I. does not create a situation
111 which there was granted only a net royalty. As a
matter· of construction the error in the recital should be
disregarded by the court, the true factual situation should
be recognized (that the royalty was gross, not net) and
the assignment 'vould thus be effective to transfer the
gross royalty 'vhieh existed. 26 C.J.S. Deeds 26.
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Plaintiffs can therefore rely on the chain of title
starting \vith Pryor and Daniel.
The second reason is as follows: U. & I. Uraniuu1
Company 1nerged into defendant Federal lT raniurn Company. lT. & I. Uranium ·Company assigned to plaintiffs'
predecessor, l\fcCormick, a gross royalty. If there \vas no
gross royalty to assign but rather only a net, then plaintiffs' predecessor would have breached its implied warranty that the thing assigned exists.

"An assignor of a right, by assignment under
seal or for value, warrants to the assignee, in the
absence of circumstances showing a contrary intention ... (b) that the right, as assigned, actually
exists and is subject to no limitations or defenses
other than those stated or apparent at the time
of the assignment.'' 1 American Law Institute
Restatement Contracts, 175 (l).
Defendant would be es·topped to assert the non
existence of that which it warranted existed.
POINT III.
THE PRICE UNDER THE URC PURCHASE
AGREEMEN'T IS NOT AL"\VAYS EQUAL TO CIRCULAR 5 PRICE PL·US ~fiLLING CO·STS.
In their statement of facts, respondents assert that
the purchase agreement entered into between them and
URC provides for a sale at a price equal to Circular 5
selling price plus milling charges. No citation of the
r·ecord is given ·to support such a statement. None can be
given. The statement could not be true when processing
charges vary at least with the following:
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(a) Average hourly lahor cost at the plant ( Tr. 7G,
reverse side).
(b) Chentical cost index

(':rr. 76, reverse side).

(c) A calciuut carbonate penalty \\·hich varies
a Hne\v effeetive plant date" (Tr. 77),

\\~ith

and the sales price varies \vith the foll·o\\-ing:
(a) The ~·cost of ore fed to process'' 'vhich varied
'vith a ne\\~ effective plant date'' (Tr. 88, reverse side).
There are no such provisos in Circular 5.

POINT IV.
CIRCULAR 5 PRI·CES ARI~~ NOT CONTROLLING.
Respondents assert that Circular 5 prices for ra'v
ore control regardless of the royalty p·rovision for~' gross
proceeds of sale." (Respondents' brief 13.) ·This assertion is based upon three reasons which we shall discuss.
1. Respondents assert that provisions in the royalty
agree1nent refer to bonuses or premiums, transportation
and dev~lopment allowances, and ore depot or purchaser,
\V'hich are tenns used in Circular 5; and conclude therefrom that Circular 5 prices govern. (Respondents' brief
14.)
This is a non-sequitur. If the parties had intended
Circular 5 prices to control, they 'vould have harl at least
a reference thereto.
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2. Resp~ondents argue that since C~ircular 5 provides
"the tern1 'ore' does not include 1nill tailings or other
mill products," that definition controls. (Respondents'
brief 1±.) But it 'vould he more reasonable to argue that
the ,v,ord "ore'' "~as used a~ a \YOr<l of art in ·Circular 5,
which, by the definition therein contained, could include
or exclude any ite1n; or to argue that, since AEC found it
necessary to exclude 1nill products, ''ore'' "Tould otherwise have ohad its usual meaning, which includes mill
products.
3. Respondents argue that it is impr.obable that
the parties intended that royalty payments should be
based upon the price of concentrated ore since "there
were no mills to which ore from the Radon ~lining Claims
could be sold until 1957, and since it 'vas not until the
Ato1nic Energy Act of 1954 '':as passed and a mill constructed in 1957" that ti tie could be retained through
the milling process. (Respondents' brief 1-!.)
Respondents don ''t point out ho'v this state1nent is
supported by the record. lTranium ore had been milled
for several years. The record, in fact, shows that as early
as 1951 AEC Circular 6 in p;roviding for bonus payments,
provided "Ores for which payments 'viii be made must
have been delivered to and paid for by either a station
or mill'' ( T·r. 39) and lists as qualified mills the follo,ving
on tihe Colorado plateau and vicinity:
United States Vanadium Company, Uravan, Colo.
United States \Tanadium Con1pany, Rifle, ·Colo.
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1')

.)

Cli1nax

l~ ranilun

L o., (;rand Junction, C·olo.
1

, .. anadilnn (jorporation of

AuH~riC'a,

Durango, Colo.

, . anadilnn Corporation of . :\1nerica, X aturita, Colo.
\ .. anadilun ·Corporation of America, Hite, Utah.
\.,.itro Chemical Co., 600 \V-est 33rd St., South, Salt
Lake City, Utah
But \Yhether or not there 'vere in fact mills on the
Colorado Plateau \Yhich \Yere milling ore seems immaterial, ~ince there \\Tould certainly be no presumption that
the parties assumed that no 1nill 'vould accep·t ore for
processing Inerely because no mill had yet done so.
Furthern1o-re, even if it be assumed there were no
Inills, the letter from Federal Uranium setting out the
~·gross proceeds of sale" royalty provision 'vas 'v-ritten
in 1955, after the passage of the 1954 act 'vhich respondents construe as authorizing such retention of title.
The following are additional reasons why Circular
5 prices are not controlling:
If they were to control, the parties would have said
so.

Circular 5 only provides a guaranteed minimum price
for the type of ore covered. X o maximum is set.
Circular 5 ap·p·lies specifically to only two types of
ore: carnotite and roscoelite ( Tr. 37). The ore from the
Radon claims is neither.
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Circular 5 relates only to deliveries at I\Ionticello,
Utah (Tr. 37). Surely the parties would presume there
could he a different marketing place in the future.
Circular 1, 'vhich became effective in 1948, set a guaranteed minimu1n price for "do1nestic refined uranium,
high grade uranium bearing ores and mechanical concentrates.'' It, and other circulars covering other minimtun prices, could have been more within the contemplation of the parties than Circular 5 which covers ore of
types not found in the Radon claims.
Circular 5 was amended on various occasions. If it
were to control, the agreement of royalty should also
change. We doubt respondents 'vould make sueh a contention.
The royalty l~anguage provides the royalty "shall
be paid by the ore depot or purchaser directly to you"
(Tr. 49). This shows that a sale to a government ore
buying depot is not the only sale contemplated.
Circular 5 expired on March 31 of this year. If it
controlled, there would be no present agreement on
royalty. We again doubt respondents would so oontend.
'The other alternative contention, that expired Circular 5 prices should control, 'vould be ridiculous.
A simple change in the 1narket 'vhereby prices for
uranium ore fall below these old Circular 5 prices (as
well might occur, particularly after 1966) 'vould quickly
change respondents assertion that it 'vould be harsh and
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unfair to apply anything but prices set by said regulation.
Circular 5 was not followed by respondents in marketing the ore, and had nothing to do with the proceeds
of sale actually received.
Respondents have treated Cireular 5 as not controlling, since Circular 5 provided for vanadiu1n pay1.nents,
yet respondents, except for a brief p·eriod, have not even
kept records upon 'vhich to compute vanadiu1n royalties.
The judgment which respondents seek to uphold also
ignores this provision for vanadium.
·Circular 5 applied only to uranium and vanadium,
yet the royalty covers all ores ""'hich might occur.

POINT \T.
THE ''GROSS PROCEEDS'' ROYALTY S_HOlTLD
xoT BE coxs·TR1ri£D AS H\TALGE OF RA''' OR.J~."
Respondents assert that they have paid all royalty
paytnents that are due, 'vhich they say have been based
on ra\\., uraniwn ore Circular 5 p·rices. They so assert
regardless of the fact that the royalty provision is based
upon ''gross proceeds.''
If their reasoning is that Circular 5 prices control,
that is fallacious for the reasons set out above under
Point IV.
If respondents' reasoning is that some indefinite
''value of raw ore" controls, respondents are being inconsistent, because because respondents themselves have
not used the "value of ra\\., ore'' as a basis for royalty
payments. This is evidenced by the following:
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Under a "value of ra\Y ore" proVIsion, not only
uranium but also vanadium and any other ores \Vould be
the basis of royalty pay1nents, 'vhereas respondents have
not paid for n1ost vanadium.
Sales have never been 1nade by respondents at the
1nine, but rather have been made at the mill; and costs
incurred after the raw ore was produced, such as costs
of concentrating by hand sorting, costs of transportation,
etc., have neither been deducted nor are they claimed.
No royalty has ever been paid at the time raw ore
was produced. Ore has been mined and stockpiled without payment of royalties. Royalty payments have been
made only at the time of sale. Respondents thereby
recognized that the language "proceeds of sale'' controls as to the time the royalty accrues, but illogically
urge that somehow it has no control as to the a1nount of
royalty.

POINT VI.
A ROYALTY BASED UPON GROSS PROCEEDS
FROM THE SALE OF ORE SHOULD HA\TE NO
D·EDUCTIONS.
The respondents cite many cases (Respondents' brief
14-23) which they contend support the proposition that
processiing charges should be deducted in computing
royalty p~ayme·nts. What respondents failed to do, was
to advise the court as to the nature of the royalty provi-
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sion~

being ronsidered. Obviously, the royalty language
i~ all in1porta.nt. \Ve have no quarrel \vith the holdings
in 1nost of the cases cited by respondents and think 1nost
are proper interpretations of the oil and gas leases involved. They are, however, neither controlling nor persuasive in the construction of our royalty p,rovision of
Hgross proceeds of sale of ore." In fact none construes a
royalty provision containing the word tdgross." Furthermore, they are oil and gas cases as distinguished from
hard roek mining cases.
Nearly all of respondents' cases on the point are contained \vithin an annotation on "Oil and Gase Lease Compensation,'' 73 ALR 2d 1056. The annotation analyzes the eases cited by respondents and others, which
analy~is we shall not reiterate, but we shall point out
the principal reasons why these cases are either not in
point or not controlling.
88

In Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 261 Ky. 840,
7• 2d 989:

s.,,

The royalty language was ''proceeds," not "gross
proceeds. "
·The decision was partly based upon an accord and
satisfaction.
The decision was partly based upon evidence as to
custom of the trade. There is no such evidence here.
It was held the p,arties intende·d tihe market at the
well to control rather than a distant market, whereas here
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the place of sale of both ra\\~ and
at a distant market, at the mill.

proce~~ed

ore haf' been

In Phillips Petroleun1 Co. 1). Ochsner, 146 F.2d 138,
the royalty language the court said it 'vas construing \Vas
''market value at the well." T~he court refused to consider "proceeds" of sale, because it said there \vas no sale.
The court said: "Lessee did not sell the gas. It sin1piy
traded it for an equal quantity of the same kind and of
the same market value in another part of the field." The
court said that a market value of gas used for gasoline,
and not for light and fuel was established, and under the
''1narket value at the well'' royalty provision ~'"rhere a
market value is sho,vn, that controls."
/The Phillips Petroleurn Co. t·. Record, 1-!6 F. :2d 485
case shows that there \Vere, in fact, in all three of the
Phillips cases two alternative royalty provisions: One
was for a royalty for gas used for the manufacture of
gasoline, which was based upon Bprevailing market rate
for gas." The other \vas for gas used off the premises
which was based upon '~gross proceeds."
The court's reasoning in Record is difficult to follow
as to which provision is applicable. The lower court had
assumed that the market value provision \vas applicable
and had so instructed the jury, to \vhich counsel took no
exception, so that there was no question before the court
as to the construction of the "gross prreeds" provision.
~ehe court, however, does by way of dicta state that:
''If, ho\\·ever, the district judge "~as " .. rong in
this, and appellees, though not excepting, could
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no'v question it, this would not advantage then1,
for the gas which defendant got in exehange for,
and, therefore, as proceeds of, plaintiffs' gas, was
gotten for and applied to the same use, to be processed in a gasoline plant, and its market value
for that use was no greater than, if as great as,
that from plaintiffs' well." (Emphasis added.)
This indicates that the court was reasoning that if the
"gross proceeds" provision were at first applicable to
the exchange of gas, that the "proceeds" in such an instance were not money, but gas received in exchange;
and that since exchange ''proceeds" gas was in turn used
for the manufacture df gasoline, that then the ''prevailing 1narket rate for gas" provision would become applicable.
The court then comes to the conclusion that unde.r a
.. prevailing market rate for gas" provision, the pertinent
market value was the market value of the gas received
in exchange, and not the market value of the p-roducts
manufactured from that gas. With such a conclusion we
do not disagree.
The court said that counsel argued that the royalty
owner was entitled "to receive not one-eighth of the
market value of the gas received in exehange, but oneeighth of the market value of the products manufactured
from the gas." This shows that not only the court but
also counsel were applying the ''prevailing market rate
for gas" provision, since had they been construing the
"gross proceeds" provision they would have said, instead, that they were entitled "to receive not one-eighth
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of the market value of the gas received in ·exchange but
one-eighth of the gross proceeds of the products manufactured from that gas."
That this \Vas the rationale Is ~hown by the san1e
Judge's decision in Phillips Petrole·unt Co. ~·. vflillianz.s,

158 F. 2d 723, in which the court said:
"The gas, for the royalty on "~hich they sue,
was used for the manufacture of gasoline, the
applicable royalty provision, therefore, is that for
the payment of the 'p·revailing market rate for
gas' and not that for "the payment of gross proceeds.'
"On careful consideration of a royalty clause
identical in language "\vith the claus-e in question
~ere and of facts as to the use of the gas identical
with those shown here.~ 1re so held 'tn Phillips
Petrolerum Co. v. Record, 5 Cir., 146 F. 2d -±85.''
In Philli.ps Petroleu1n Co. v. Williams, 158 F. 2d 7:23~
the same royalty p-rovision of Hprevailing market rate
for gas" was cons trued. The court said:
"The gas, for the royalty on ,v,hich they sue,
was used for the manufacture of gasoline, the
applicable royalty provision, therefore, is that for
the payment of the 'prevailing market rate for
gas' and not that for 'the paynzent of gross proceeds'."
It is app·arent therefrom that the court decided as it
did because the ~gross proceeds'' provision did not apply,
the implication being that, had it applied, the actual sales
price "·ould !have been used as the royalty basis, rather
4
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than market value. These Phillips cas·es therefore support our po:-;ition and not respondents.
In 1llat.zen c. Ilngoton Product,ion Co., 182 Kan. 456,
321 P. 2d 576, the royalty language 'vas ~·proceeds from
the sale of the gas." The royalty o'vner conceded that the
royalty should be determined at the 'veil head and that
the royalty owner s/hould pay reasonable expenses of
gathering, processing and 1narketing the gas produced,
where it was transported by the operator in its pip·e
line off the premises and processed and sold. The royalty
owner claimed that proceeds of sale meant the same thing
as fair value. The operator claimed it meant proceeds
of sale and that it could deduct its income tax therefrom.
The royalty o'vner conceded that if it meant p·roceeds of
sale tQtat it Ineant net proceeds but argued that taxes were
not a deductible item. The lo,ver court used the "proceeds
less expenses" theory and allowed no income tax deduction. This was affirmed on ap·p·eal the court holding that
proceeds of sale control rather than value. This case
construed "proceeds" as '~net p·roceeds'' but the important point is that it found that actual proceeds controlled
over value. Had the language of the royalty been "gross
proceeds," the result of this case would have been that
actual proceeds control over value and no deductions
could be allowed. This is the very point we are urging.
The concurring opinion even states that counsel
should not have conceded that there should be any deduction from the proceeds and had there been no such concession the royalty owner could have recovered gross
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proceeds even though the word "gross" 'vas not a part
of the royalty provision. The concurring opinion states:
"In view of the contentions of the plaintiffs
that their royalty is detennined at the "Tellhead
and their concession that they must bear a share
of the reasonable costs of gathering, processing
and marketing the gas produced, I concur that the
judgment must be affirmed. I am in full accord
that proceeds from the sale of gas is the measure
of plaintiffs' royalty under the terms of the leases.
However, I do not wish to be bound by the majority opinion in the event an action ''"'ould be filed
involving a royalty clause as is here presented and
the plaintiff alleges, proves and here contends that
royalty is determined from proceeds from the sale
of gas without deduction of costs of gathering,
processing and marketing. Proceeds of a sale,
unless there is something in the context showing
to the contrary, means total proceeds.''
In Freeland v. Sun 0£1 Co., 185 F. Supp. 75-±, 277 F.
2d 154, there were again t\YO alternative royalty provisions, one of which \vould be applicable depending upon
1fue use to which the gas was put. One \vas based upon
"the amount actually received." The other 'vas based
upon "market value at the \Yell." Respondents in their
brief at page 21 infer that this case eonstrues the "amount
realized" provision. The court bases its decision upon the
fact that it is the "market value'' royalty provision "rhich
controls, and not the "amount realized" provision. This
implies that had the applicable royalty provision ·been
''amount actually received'' the result \vould have been
that the royalty O\vner \\Tould have been entitled to the
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~ro~s

proeeeds 'vith no deductions. This again

IS

the

prPcise point we are urging.

In Cloyle ·r. Lo'ltisiana Gas & ]/uel Co., 175 La. 990,
1-t--l So. 737, the royalty o'vner clailned a royalty on casing
head gas from a gas well, expense free. The lease didn't
expressly cover the situation but provided that as to oil
one-eighth should be "free of cost," saying nothing as to
the eost on gas royalty of "one-eighth royalty for the gas
from each well where gas only is found.''' The uppe-r
court held, at first, that no deductions should be allowed,
but reversed the ruling on re-hearing and allowed the
operator to deduct the cost ''to preserve the gas and its
gasoline content by making both merchantable." The
decision 'vas based upon the fact that the oil royalty provision expressly provided that the royalty should be "free
of cost,'' wthereas, the gas provision made no such provision. The court reasoned that having expressly provided
that it should be free of cost in one instanc.e, the sile·nce
in the other instance implied that there should be a sharing of cost.
In our case there was no necessity to p·rocess uranium
to make it marketable. There was a ready market for raw
ore. Further, t!he provision for a royalty "free of cost''
is the equivalent of "gross.'' Since the Louisiana court
based its decision upon the omission of the phrase "free
of cost," the implication is that had such phrase been included, the ruling would have been that no deduction
for expenses could be made in paying the royalty. Tthe
Louisiana court would, therefore, decide a "gross pro-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
ceeds'' royalty as meaning that the operator could not
deduct expenses in making royalty payments.
In Crichton v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 178 La. 57,
150 So. 668, the royalty provision 'vas "market value."
T'he op,erator had gas "rhich 'Yas impregnated with gasoline processed by a third party and received therefron1
one-third of the product rendered marketable by processing. The court held that the royalty should be based upon the one-third reeeived. This resulted in the court basing the royalty up,on the gross proceeds even though it
was a market value provision, since one-third of the
product 'vas all that the operator received.
In Wall v. United Gas P~tblic Service Co., 178 La.
908, 152 So. 561, the royalty language 'vas "market price.''
'The royalty holder claimed the royalty should be based
upon sales price a"~ay from the 'veils. Evidence in the
case showed what the market price in the field 'vas. The
court held that the market price controlled over sales
price at a distant market. The court distinguished t'vo
cases on their facts saying,
"Counsel for plaintiffs, in support of t'heir
argument that 'market price' means the price at
which the gas was sold cite the cases of Barton,
et al v. Oil & j f £ning Co., 27 Old. 416, 112 P.965,
and Ladd v. Uphan~ (Tex. Civ. App.) 58 S.,\:'". (2d)
1037, 1038.
''These cases do not support their proposition.
The royalty clauses in those eases are not like the
one in the ease at bar. In neither of the cases W'"as
the lessee required to settle at the '1narket price'
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of the gas. In the Barton case it \vas agreed that
if gas "Tas discovered, the consideration to the
lessor should be 'one-tenth portion of each gas
well drilled on the premises herein described when
utilized and sold off the premis·es.' The court interpreted that to mean that the lessor was to receive a one-tenth portion of the proceeds of the
gas when sold off the premises.
'"In the case at bar, the lessor \Vas not to receiv·e a one-eighth 'portion of the proceeds \vhen
sold off the premises,' but one-eighth of the market
value of the gas.
•·In the I,jadd ease, the contract provided that
'the lessee shall pay lessor as royalty one-eighth
of the p·roceeds from the sale of gas as such'.''
The court \Yas distinguishing cas.e~s \vith royalty p·rovi~ions si1nilar to ours. The implication is that had the
court been confronted with our royalty language the actual proceeds \vould he the basis of the royalty with no
deductions.
In T"'" e.dder Petroleum Corp. v. Lambert Lands Co.,
50 Cal. .A.pp. 2d 102, 122 P. 2d 600, the royalty language
'vas based upon the "value of all oil produced ... afte~r
making the customary deductions for temperature,
water" etc.
This is simply a "value" case with which we do
not disagree.
Respondents argue that the court defined "oil" as
meaning •'crude oil" and infer that is authority that
"ore'' in our case means '•raw ore." In the Vedder case

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
the court based its conclusion, that oil n1eant crude oil,
upon thirty-eigl1t references in the lease "'"here it clearly could only 1nean crude oil. There is not one such
reference in our instrument.
Western G1.tlf Oil Co. v. Title Insurance Co., 206
P .2d 643, is a cas-e similar to the , . . edder case.

In Ree,d v Hacku:orth, 287 S.vY·. 2d 912, the royalty
language was based upon "'gas produced". The lease
was silent as to the place of market and the price of
gas. The gas was piped t\\ro miles by the producer and
sold by him for 25¢, 10¢ of \vhich was "'specifically apportioned ... as the cost of piping." The court held that
the royalty should not include the 10¢ for piping. The
court s:aid :
''If a lease is silent on the question, royalty
should be based upon the 1narket value of the
gas at the well.
"Since the contract (of sale) explicitly recogniees .a price of fifteen ce uts, \\'"e think the appelle'e is entitle~d to a one-eighth royalty b.ased upo-n
that price."
~The

court bases the royalty, even though a royalty
in kind, upon market value, and bases that market value
upon sales priee, saying that the cost of piping 'vas not
p·art of the· sales price.
e do not see that the case is
at. all in point for a" gross proceeds" royalty provision.

'V

In Danciger Oil & Ref'lneries, Inc. v. Hamill Dr·illi11g ·Co., 171 S.W. 2d 321_, the royalty was based upon
"market price" "rhich the court construed as meaning
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1narket value of gas. The eourt said that if there ""'as no
1narket then dvalue'' controls. This case is not in point
for a "gross proceeds" provision.
In l.~e()unu Oil G1o. r. Sntith, 306 S.vV. 2d 190, the
royalty \vas based upon the price '"at the wells." There
"ras no market for gas at the wells. In order to make it
Jnarketable, gas \\"'as piped to a dehydration plant where
it was then sold. All parties and the court assumed that
the cost of dehydration at a distant dehydration plant
"ras deductible under such royalty provision. The only
question involved \\"'as ",~Ju~ther the c.ost thereof should
be the reasonable eost, or the actual cost of dehydration.

It is thus apparent that none of respondents' cases
supports their proposition that expenses should be deducted from a '~gross proceeds'' royalty, since the cases
either construe a ·'p-roceeds'' royalty as net proceeds,
or they construed a market value provision, under either
of which, expenses are properly deductible.
In addition to the cases cited by respondents, the
reasoning of which s.upports our position that there
should be no deduction from a gross proceeds royalty,
the following four cases are of interest:

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, (5th Cir.) 155
F.2d 185, 188, 198, holds that a "net proceeds'' royalty
should not be construed as a "value'' royalty. The court
said:
"In so far as the gas was 'marketed' we think
the stipulation for a share of the 'net proceeds
derived' ought to be enforced, effect being given
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to the 'vords 'net at the mouth of the well by allo--w·ing as expense the cost of transporting, separating, and marketing. This lessor ~did not cot~
sen.t to be left to the uncertainties of 'fair value'
or even 'market price' as to the gas, but was willing to take one-eighth of wha.t the lessee sold vt
for, relying on the lessee's interest to secure a
good sale." (Emphasis added.)
In Ladd v. Upham (Te.r. Civ. App.) 58 S.,\T. (2d)
1037, 1038, the royalty 'vas based on ''p-roceeds from
the sale of gas.'' In construing this. "proceeds" provision, the civil ap·peals court said:
''In view of these exp·ress terms we feel unwilling to say that the lessee would be compelled
to deliver to the lessor at the mouth of the well
any part of the gas produced. The lessee under
the terms of the· lease was given full power and
control of the entire production and if, in order
to obtain a better price for the gas, he chose to
construct pipe lines or otherwise to convey it to
a point or poinrts beyond the lease and thus receive greater p·rofit, he could do ~o, hut could not
escape the obligation in favor of the lessor imposed by the terms of the lease.''
This decision was cited with approval by this court in
U. S. Sntelting, Refining <f Mining Con1pany v. Haynes,
111 U. 172, 176 P.2d 6:2:2. The Texas Supre1ne Court
affirmed this case, 95 S. \\T. 2d 365. In doing so, it indicated that the cost of transportation to 1narket 1night be
a deductible ite1n, thus eonsidering p·roceeds as possibly
1neaning net proceeds rather than gross. Had the languagP been gross proee·eds, '' as in our case, no such
H
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qualification eould logically have been Ina<le in affirming
the decision.
In Roberts v. f3u·anson, 222 S.W. 2d 707 (Tex. Civ.
.1\ pp. 19±9), oil \vas to be delivered ''free and clear of
all costs and expenses'' at the p~ipe line or other delivery
point. It \\Tas delivered to a p~urchaser at a distant refinery rather than at the well. The court held that the
cost of transportation was not deductible from the royalty.
HFree and clear of all costs'' is the equivalent of our
"gross,'' and under neither should there be a deduction. If a deduction 'vere allowed for milling costs, there
sli.ould just as logically be deductions for other costs
such as sorting, transportation, etc. Even respondents
don't claim other cost deductions, but illogically single
out cost of milling as the only allowable deduction.
Respondents selected the time of sale. They paid
no royalty on stockpiled ore. Ore in its raw state was
marketable, but for an advantage to the·mselves, they
retained title to the ore through the processing stage.
One consequence thereof was an advantage of a higher
depletion allowance. Another consequence should be a
disadvantage of a higher royalty payment.
In State v. Hobart Iron Co., 143 Minn. 457, 172
N.W. 899, 175 N.W. 100, 176 N.W. 758, the lease provided:
"The lessee agrees to pay 'for all the iron ore mined
and removed ... at the rate of 25c per ton.... '' The lo'v
grade, unmarketable ore was washed in order to make
the ore marketable, and was then sold. The court held
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that, under the terrns of the lease, the parties intended
that royalty should be based upon tonnage as mined
rather than lesser tonnage after concentration by washing. At first blush, this cas.e might appear to be against
appellants because it bases the royalty on tonnage prior
to concentration. Ho\vever, that determination "\\"as rnade
because of the peculiar language of the lease, not present
in our case. The importance of this case is that the operator bears the cost of concentration, with no sharing
therein by the royalty owner. Furthermore, the court
did not base its decision upon any contention that concentrated ore was not .ore, but assumed that both ore
and concentrates were ''ore," and then looked to the language of the lease to determine whether the royalty
should be based on tonnage of ra". . ore or tonnage of
concentrated ore.

POINT VII
SALES OF CONCENTRATED ORE ARE SALES
OF ORE.
In arguing that concentrates are not ore, respondents cite several cases upon which we comment as follows:

In Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11, 29 L.Ed. 550, and
Ozark Chemical Company v. Jones, 125 F.2d 1, 2, the
following definition is given:
Ore is a "compound of metal and so~e.other
substance, as oygen, sulphur, or arsenic called
its mineralizer by \Yhich its properties are distinguished or lost."
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Respondent8, in their brief, emphasize the phrase
''by \\'hich its properties are distinguished or lost." How
thi~ helps respondents we fail to see, in that, as pointed
out in our original brief, the prop·erties of uranimn are
still distinguis:hed or lost whether the ore is in a raw
or concentrated stage, because, in both, the mineralizer
oygen is present, as evidenced by the fact that in sales
of both ra"r and concentrated ore, contained U30s is sold.
The co1npound does not have the properties of the rnetal.
In an admiralty case of Arneri.can & Cub.an B.S.
Linje, Inc. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co. 281 F. 725, a differentiation is made bet,veen copper ore and cop·per concentrate because of the physical differences between
them. The question decided was whether or not the terms
of a charter had heen complied \vith, where the charter provided for the haulage of ore. A surprised captain, \Yhose ship \vas equipped to carry an expected solid
cargo, \Vas forced to accept a liquid slurry. During the
voyage, a storm was encountered and the slopping cargo
sank the ship. The decision was based upon exp·ert testimony as to the nature of concentrates, none of which
is present here. We do not contend that there is no difference between raw and concentrated ore as to their
appearance and physical characteristics. Our contention
is that ore includes both raw ore and concentrated ore.
As pointed out in State v. Hobart Iron Co. (supra)
the court, in construing a royalty based on "iron ore
mined and removed" assumed that concentrated ore was
"ore" and said that the concentrating ''results in makSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing the mined ore in a practical sense and in the sense
of the lease '1nerchantable shipping iron ore'.''
POIN'T \TIII
WHEITHER OR NOT DEPLETION ALLOWAN,CE
CAN BE TAKEN IS XOT AN ISSlTE.
Respondents argue that appellants could not take
an increased allo"\\rance, resulting fron1 an increase in
price due to concentration, even if "proceeds of sale"
was always applicable rather than just applicable in the
future. They cite authority to that effect. The Internal
Revenue Code has been amended since the decision cited,
and there are contrary authorities. \\T e shall not cite
such authorities because it is not an issue in this case.
Suffice it to say that appellants think they can take a
depletion, and a correct interpretation of the royalty language would give the1n an opportunity to clai1n such a
depletion. As a matter of fact, there is also a question
as to whether or not respondents can prop,erly take such
increased depletion, since 26 USCA 613 allo,vs it in the
case o:f ''ores or minerals w·hich are not custo1narily sold
in the form of the crude mineral product,'' so that respondents would have to establish that uranium is not
customarily sold in its ra'Y state, but rather that ore is
customarily sold in its concentrated state in order to
properly get increased depletion. Such an assertion is
the exaet opposite of their assertion in this case.
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CON·CLUSION

Respondents advance no argument 1n defense of
the lower court's ruling that dismissed the case, (when it
had before it only motions concerning the basis of accounting) other than that appellants either had not raised
issues, or having raised them, had waived them. 'The
record does not support them, but in fact shows that
appellants claimed an accounting for the proceeds of
sale ore, which would entail an accountin.g for vanadium, as well a.s uranium; an accounting for fictitious

haulage allo,vance, if the allowance in fact was a proceeds
of sale; and an accounting as to the amount of proceeds
regardless of the basis of the royalty.
The respondents' contention that ''gross proceeds
of sale of ore" does not mean what it says, but that it
means there should be deducted from the proceeds cost
of processing ore; or in the alternative that it means
the value of raw ore, is not supported by any authority
cited by them. To the contrary the very cases cited by
respondents, and other cases, differentiate between ''proceeds" royalties and ''value'' royalties, and properly construe them to give meaning to the plain language used by
the parties. Deductions are allowed only if "gross"
is not used, or if "value" is being determined.
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The judgment should be reversed and appellants'
motion for summary judgment should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

DELANEY & BALCOMB and
BRAYTON, LOWE & HURLEY
1001 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs-Appellants
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